The JH hash function is one of the five finalists of the ongoing NIST SHA3 hash function competition. Despite several earlier attempts, and years of analysis, the indifferentiability security bound of the JH mode has so far remained remarkably low, only up to n/3 bits [7] . Using a recent technique introduced by Moody, Paul, and Smith-Tone in [23], we improve the bound of JH to n/2 bits. We also performed experiments which verify the theoretically obtained results.
Introduction
Iterative hash functions are usually composed of two parts: (1) a basic primitive C with finite domain and range, and (2) an iterative mode of operation H to extend the domain of the hash function. We denote a hash function using the mode H and the primitive C by H C . In studying the security of a hash function, both the security of the primitive C, as well as the security of the mode of operation H need to be examined separately, since one can be attacked independently of the other.
The most popular hash mode of operation is the classical Merkle-Damgård MD mode [12, 22] . It has the desirable property that if C is collision resistant, then MD C will also be collision resistant. Many practical hash functions, such as MD4 [28] , MD5 [29] , SHA-0/1/2 [25, 26] use the MD mode of operation. However, several recent attacks have greatly undermined the security of any hash function based on the MD mode. Examples of such attacks include the length-extension attack, Joux's multi-collision attack [16] , the KelseyKohno herding attack [17] , and the Kelsey-Schneier preimage attack [18] . Each of these attacks targets the mode of operation, and they work no matter how secure the underlying primitive C is. A telltale sign of the demise of the MD mode is that none of the 64 submissions to the ongoing SHA-3 competition used the MD mode.
In search of a secure replacement for the Merkle-Damgård mode, we have broadly witnessed several stages of improvement: (1) additional postprocessing and/or counters injected into the MD mode to eliminate the length-adjustment related attacks (e.g., HAIFA [8] , EMD [4] , MDP [15] ); (2) widening of the output length of the primitive C to eliminate Joux's multi-collision type attacks (e.g., Widepipe-MD [20] , JH [30] , Grøstl [14] , Sponge [5] , Shabal [10] , Parazoa [3] ); (3) multiple applications of the primitive C on the same message-block (e.g., Doublepipe MD [20] ).
Another research direction, motivated by the innovative attacks on hash modes of operation, has been the development of new security frameworks which cover the above attacks, as well as unforeseen attacks. The indifferentiability framework was introduced by Maurer et al. [21] in 2004, and was first applied to analyze hash modes of operation by Coron et al. [11] in 2005. Indifferentiability measures the extent to which a hash function is behaving as a random oracle under the assumption that the underlying compression function is ideal (e.g. a random oracle, ideal permutation, or ideal cipher). A hash mode proven secure in the indiffer entiability framework guarantees resistance to the attacks specifically mentioned above. Most new proposals for hash modes of operation include indifferentiability proofs of security. We note that some limitations of the indifferentiability framework have recently been discovered in [13] and [27] . Nevertheless, the framework still covers most known attack scenarios, in addition to guaranteeing resistance to many generic attacks. In this work we prove an indifferentiability bound for JH, one of the five finalists in the SHA-3 hash competition. Related Work: Since its publication, the JH mode of operation has undergone rigorous cryptanalysis. Previous indifferentiability security proofs for the JH mode were only able to obtain a bound of n/3 bits [2, 7] . In [19] , it was shown that the JH mode achieves optimal collision resistance. However, improvement of the indifferentiability security of the JH mode beyond n/3 bits has remained elusive.
Our Contribution: We improve the indifferentiability security bound of the JH mode from n/3 to n/2 bits. This result guarantees the absence of generic attacks on the JH hash function with work Ω(2 n/2 ). Furthermore, we have performed a series of experiments with the JH mode using several sets of 'bad' events. These bad events will be described later on. Our experiments verify the theoretically obtained results.
Notation and Convention. Throughout the paper we let n be a fixed integer. We shall use the little endian bit-ordering system. The symbol |x| denotes the bit-length of the bit-string x, or sometimes the size parse of the set x. Let x → x 1 ||x 2 denote parsing x into x 1 and x 2 such that |x 1 | = n and |x 2 | = |x| − n. Let S X denote the sample space of the discrete random variable X. The relation A ∼ B is satisfied if and only if n n Pr A = X = Pr B = X for all X ∈ S, where S = S A = S B . Other notation which we will use is included in Table 1 . Algorithm A with oracle access to B Dom(T )
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work for a hash function based on an 
In addition to the injectivity of pad(·), we will also require that there exists a function dePad(·) that can efficiently compute M , given pad(M ). Formally, the function dePad :
, 1} * , and otherwise dePad(·) returns λ. We note that the padding rules of all practical hash functions have the above properties.
Preliminaries: Introduction to the Indifferentiability Framework
We begin with the definition of a random oracle. This useful object will be used frequently in the subsequent discussion.
Definition 1.1 (Random oracle)
A random oracle is a function RO : X → Y chosen uniformly at ran dom from the set of all |Y | |X| functions that map X → Y . In other words, a function RO : X → Y is a random oracle if and only if, for each x ∈ X, the value of RO(x) is chosen uniformly at random from Y .
where x / ∈ {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x q }, y ∈ Y and q ∈ Z.
Next we introduce the indifferentiability framework and briefly discuss its significance. The definition we give is a slightly modified version of the original definition provided in [11, 21] . Definition 1.3 (Indifferentiability framework) [11] An interactive Turing machine (ITM) T with or acle access to an ideal primitive F is said to be (t A , t S , q, ε)-indifferentiable from an ideal primitive G if there exists a simulator S such that, for any distinguisher A, the following equation is satisfied:
The simulator S is an ITM which has oracle access to G and runs in time at most t S . The distinguisher A runs in time at most t A . The number of queries used by A is at most q. Here ε is a negligible function in the security parameter of T .
of the framework is as follows. Suppose, an ideal primitive G (e.g. a variable-input-length random oracle) is indifferentiable from an algorithm T based on another ideal primitive F (e.g. a fixed-input-length random oracle). In such a case, any cryptographic system P based on G is as secure as P based on T F (i.e., G replaces T F in P). For a more detailed explanation, we refer the reader to [21] .
Pictorial Description of Definition 1.3( Figure 3 ). In the figure, the five entities involved in Defini tion 1.3 are shown: T , F, G and S have been replaced by a hash mode H, an ideal permutation π/π −1 , a random oracle RO, and a pair of simulators S/S −1 . For the purposes of our paper, H is the JH hash mode described in Figure 2 , based on the permutation π (see Figure 1) . In this setting, Definition 1.3 addresses the degree to which any computationally bounded adversary is unable to distinguish between Option 1 and Option 2.
Indifferentiability Framework for JH: Definitions To study the indifferentiability security of the JH mode, we use the ideal permutation π/π −1 : {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} 2n as the basic primitive of JH. To obtain the indifferentiability security bound for the JH mode, we follow the usual game-playing techniques [1, 4] . The schematic diagrams of the two cryptographic systems Option 1 and Option 2 (of Figure 3) are Game(JH, π, π −1 ) and Game(RO, S, S −1 ) illustrated in Figure 4 . The other game G 1 is an intermediate step, allowing us to more easily compare the games. The pseudocode for each game is provided in Section 3. Informally, a game takes an adversarial query as input and produces an output. A simple example is the description of Game(JH, π, π −1 ) which is provided in Figure 5 (a). We now formally define a game. Definition 2.1 (Game) A game is a stateful probabilistic algorithm that takes an adversary-generated query as input, updates the current state, and produces an output to the adversary.
The notion of equivalence of games will play a central role in the security reduction processes in the coming sections. To put it loosely, two games are equivalent if their input-output distributions are identical. To make the definition simpler we restrict ourselves only to games that expose identical interfaces to their adversaries. This allows us to define equivalence of a pair of games when they interact with the same adversary. Before we give the formal definition of equivalent games, we introduce the notion of the view of a game. Definition 2.2 (View of a game) Let (x i y i ) denote the i th query and response pair from the game G, when it interacts with the adversary A. The view of the game G after i queries with respect to the adversary A, is defined to be the sequence {(x 1 y 1 ), . . . , (x i y i )}. 
A
and G 2 with respect to the adversary A is denoted by G 1 ≡ G 2 , or simply G 1 ≡ G 2 , when the adversary is clear from the context.
Next we state an important lemma relating the equivalence of games and the adversarial outputs. 
RO,S/S −1
In the following sections we shall estimate Adv using the following approach:
JH,π/π −1
• In Section 3 and 4 we describe the security games presented in Figure 4 ; an important part of the description is designing a simulator-pair S/S −1 for the indifferentiability framework for JH, and com puting an upper bound of O(σ 5 ) on the running time of the simulator-pair, where σ is the maximum
n n number of invocations to the ideal permutation π/π −1 . Additionally, we shall show that Game(JH,
which implies by Lemma 2.4, Pr
A G 1 = Pr ⇒ 1 . This, in turn, implies:
• Then in Section 5 we shall show
The n/2 bit indifferentiability security bound follows from this last equation.
Description of the Security Games for JH
In this section, we elaborate on the games Game(JH, π, π −1 ), G 1 , and Game(RO, S, S −1 ) that are schemat ically presented in Figure 4 . The pseudocode for all the games is given in Figure 5 . The functions JH, JH1, and RO are mappings from {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n . We use the generic term long oracle (or l-oracle) to identify any of them and call any query submitted to a long oracle an l-query. Also, π, and S1 are permutations on {0, 1} 2n . The oracle S is a mapping from {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} 2n . These three oracles are called forward short oracles (or forward s-oracles). The corresponding queries are called forward s-queries. Similarly, π −1 , S1 −1 , and S −1 are also permutations on {0, 1} 2n which are called reverse short oracles (or reverse s-oracles). We assume that identical queries are not submitted more than once. The games will use several global and local variables. The tables D l , D s , and all local variables are initialized with ⊥. The graph T s initially contains only the root node (IV, IV b ). The local variables are re-initialized every new invocation of the game, while the global data-structures maintain their states across the queries.
Description of Game(JH, π, π −1 ) ( Figure 5(a) ). The game Game(JH, π, π −1 ) implements three func tions: the l-oracle JH π , the forward s-oracle π, and the reverse oracle π −1 . The definition of the function JH π was given in Section 2. The ideal permutation π/π −1 has been implemented through lazy sampling. The query-response pairs for π/π −1 are stored in the table D s .
105. return r; PartialGraph(x, r); Description of Game(RO, S, S −1 ) (Figure 5(c) ). In this game, the pair of s-oracles S/S −1 is the simulator pair for the indifferentiability framework of JH. The l-oracle of this game implements the random oracle RO. Construction of an effective simulator pair is perhaps the most important part in the analysis of the indifferentiability security for a hash mode of operation. The purpose of the simulator pair S/S −1 is two-fold: (1) to output values which are indistinguishable from the output of the ideal permutation π/π −1 , and (2) to respond in such a way that JH π (M ) and RO(M ) are identically distributed. It will easily follow that as long as the simulator pair S/S −1 is able to output values satisfying the above conditions, no adversary can distinguish between Game(JH, π, π −1 ) and Game(RO, S, S −1 ).
Our design strategy for S/S −1 is fairly intuitive and simple. However, before jumping into a detailed description, we define the data structures and the subroutines. The game uses three global data structures: the table D s , which stores all s-queries and their responses, the table D l , which stores all l-queries and their responses, and finally a specially designed directed graph T s .
• Subroutine description. Additionally and more importantly, the graph T s contains all possible paths derived from the elements in D s ; hence the name FullGraph.
• Subroutine MessageRecon(x, T s ): The purpose of this subroutine is to reconstruct all messages M , such that JH π (M ) can be computed using the elements in D s , and π(x). As the final input to π in On a new reverse s-query r, S −1 returns a uniformly sampled 2n-bit value chosen from the set {0, 1} 2n \ Dom(D s ) (lines 301 and 302).
For a new l-query M , the random oracle RO first checks whether M has already been reconstructed using forward s-queries. In such a case, M already belongs to Dom(D l ) and RO returns the least-significant n bits of
is assigned a uniformly sampled 2n-bit value (line 002), and the least-significant n bits are returned (line 003).
Time Complexity of the Simulator S Since there are i queries after i rounds, the maximum number of nodes in T s is i 2 . Therefore, to construct the fullgraph at ith round, the amount of time required is O(i 4 ). Now if the adversary submits σ queries, then the time complexity is O(σ 5 ). Since the fullgraph construction dominates the simulator time, the simulator time complexity is also O(σ 5 ).
Description of G 1 (Fig. 5(b) ). The description of the game G 1 might look a bit artificial in the sense that it was constructed as a hybridization of the games Game(JH, π, π −1 ) and Game(RO, S, S −1 ). The purpose of this game is to be a transition point from Game(JH, π, π −1 ) to Game(RO, S, S −1 ) so that their difference in execution can be easily examined. As in Game(RO, S, S −1 ), the global variables are the tables D s and D l , and the graph T s . In our initial description of this game, we omit the statements where the variable BAD is set (lines 000, 100, 102, 405, 601, and 603), since they do not impact the output and the global data structures. The variable BAD is set when certain events occur in the global data structures. Those events will be discussed,
when we compute Pr ⇒ 1 −Pr ⇒ 1 in Section 5. The subroutines in this game are similar to the ones for Game(RO, S, S −1 ):
• Subroutine PartialGraph(x, r): Like FullGraph, this subroutine also builds the graph T s in such a way that each directed path originating from the root-node (IV, IV b ) represents the execution of JH(·) on a prefix of some message (depicted in Figure 6 ). However, there are important differences. Rather than building all possible paths using the new pair (x, r) and the old pairs in D s , PartialGraph augments T s in at most one phase; hence its name.
PartialGraph invokes the subroutine CreateCoset(y c = x[0, n − 1]), which returns a set Coset containing all nodes in T s , whose left-coordinate is y c (lines 401 and 402). The size of Coset determines the number of nodes to be added to T s in the the current iteration. Using the members of Coset and the new pair (x, r), new edges are constructed, stored in EdgeNew, and added to T s using the subroutine AddEdge.
• Subroutine MessageRecon(x, T b ): This subroutine is virtually the same as described in game Game(RO, s S, S −1 ). The only difference is that instead of the graph T s , the second argument to this subroutine is T b , which is the maximally connected subgraph of T s with root-node (IV, IV b ), generated by a part of s the table D s which contains only the forward s-queries and their responses. Note that in addition to for ward s-query/responses, D s may also contains reverse s-query/responses, as well as π-query/response pairs generated during the execution of l-queries. This is a significant difference between this game and Game(RO, S, S −1 ), which does not have any π-queries arising from the processing of an l-query. This difference will be quantified in Section 5.
is returned by S1. Otherwise, π(x) is computed (line 101). We see the ideal permutation π is implemented through lazy sampling (lines 301 and 302). The subroutine MessageRecon is called with input (x, T b ), which returns a set of reconstructed messages M (line 
4
The reverse s-oracle S1 −1 is identical to the oracle S −1 of Game(RO, S, S −1 ). If an l-query M has already been reconstructed by S1 on some previous forward s-query, then 
Remark 1
The difference in how the subroutines FullGraph and PartialGraph construct the directed graph T s forms the first non-trivial step towards improving the bound for the indifferentiability security of JH. The PartialGraph augments T s in at most one phase every invocation. It is easy to see that the graph T s arising from PartialGraph is a connected subgraph of the T s constructed by the FullGraph. We will show that if the events in lines 000, 001, 100, 102, 405, 601, and 603 do not occur, then both subroutines build identical graphs. As a consequence, the probability of occurrence of these "BAD" events constitutes a significant fraction of JH's overall indifferentiability bound of O( σ 2 n 2 ). It seems possible that if PartialGraph were to augment T s in more than one phase, the indifferentiability bound could be further improved. However, in this case, the determination of a non-trivial upper-bound on the probability of the BAD events seems to be hard. For more details, see the extended version of this paper.
With the above description of the games at our disposal, we are well equipped to state and prove an easy, but important, result. Proof. From the description of S1, and S1
−1 , we observe that, for all x ∈ {0, 1} 2n , S1(x) = π(x), and S1 −1 (x) = π −1 (x) (lines 101, and 602). Likewise, from the descriptions of JH1 and JH, for all M ∈ {0, 1} * ,
JH1(M ) =JH(M ). D
The events Type1, Type2, Type3, and Type4 mentioned in Figure 5 (b) are still undefined. These events are used to distinguish game G 1 from game Game(RO, S, S −1 ). We describe them in the next section.
Definition of the events BAD i , and GOOD i
For the remainder of the paper, by a query we will mean either a message-block in an l-query, or a forward or reverse s-query. With this convention, we see that prior to the i th query, the sum of the s-queries and message-blocks contained in l-queries is thus i − 1. The purpose of this section is to concretely define the Type1, Type2, Type3 and Type4 events mentioned in lines 405, 603, 001, 100, 102, 000, and 601 of game G 1 ( Figure 5(b) ). Before doing so, we define a few additional events that can be defined using the Type1, Type2, Type3, and Type4 events.
• Let the symbol BAD i denote the event when the variable BAD is set (in lines 405, 603, 001, 100, 102, 000, and 601) on the i th query in game G 1 . In other words, BAD i occurs when one or more of Type1, Type2, Type3, or Type4 events occur on the i th query in game G 1 .
• The symbol GOOD i denotes ¬ ∨ i j=1 BAD i b for all i > 0.
• We use the symbol GOOD 0 to denote the event when no queries have been submitted in game G 1 .
From a high level, the intuition behind the construction of the BAD i events in the game G 1 is rather straight forward. We make sure that if BAD i does not occur, and if GOOD i−1 did occur, then the views of G 1 and Game(RO, S, S −1 ) (up to the i th query) are identically distributed for any attacker A. Hence, the BAD i events will establish the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 (Computational Paradigm) For the games G 1 and Game(RO, S, S −1 ), interacting with an indifferentiability adversary A limited by σ queries, we have
The computational paradigm in Lemma 4.1 has been used in most well-known constructions [1, 4, 5, 6, 24] . However, it is worth remembering that the BAD i events designed in the earlier attempts led to indifferen tiability bounds which did not go beyond n/3 bits [7] . In our present case, we had to use deeper insight to construct a different set of BAD i events to extend the bound up to n/2 bits. This primarily involved tricks to overcome the interleaving of branches in successive π calls in the JH mode. As mentioned in Remark 1, these events are an important contribution of this paper.
Proof. [Proof Sketch of Lemma 4.1] The second part of the lemma is easy. To prove the first part, we need to show
Let V 1,i and V 2,i denote the views of the games G 1 , and Game(RO, S, S −1 ), after i queries have been pro cessed. To prove equation (1), it is sufficient to show given GOOD σ−1 , that V 1,σ and V 2,σ are identically distributed. We use induction on the number of rounds.
Induction Hypothesis: Given GOOD i−1 , then V 1,i and V 2,i are identically distributed. Note the hypothesis is clearly true when i = 1.
To show: Given GOOD i , we need that V 1,i+1 and V 2,i+1 are identically distributed. The proof is established by observing the BAD i+1 events (or, equivalently the Type1, 2, 3 and 4 events occurring in the (i+1) th round of the game G 1 ) described below. As already mentioned, the Type1, 2, 3 and 4 events were custom-designed so that the lemma would hold. Observe that, given GOOD i−1 , and given V 1,i = V 2,i :
1. Any l-queries submitted by A are identically distributed for the games G 1 , and Game(RO, S, S −1 ). This is easy to see since V 1,i = V 2,i .
Any s-queries submitted by
A are identically distributed for the games G 1 , and Game(RO, S, S −1 ). This again follows easily ince V 1,i = V 2,i .
3. The graphs T b , and T s constructed in the games G 1 , and Game(RO, S, S −1 ) are identical. This can be s shown by observing the Type1, 2, 3 and 4 events described later in this section.
4. The outputs of the l-queries returned by RO, and JH1 follow the uniform distribution U[0, 2 n − 1], given that BAD i+1 did not occur. This is established using point 3, along with the description of the events in Section 4.
5. The outputs of the forward s-queries returned by S, and S1 also follow the uniform distribution U[0, 2 2n − 1], if BAD i+1 did not occur. Similarly, this can be shown using point 3, and the description of the events to follow.
6. Finally, the outputs of the reverse s-queries returned by S −1 , and S1 −1 follow an identical distribution, assuming BAD i+1 did not occur. This also will follow from point 3, and the description of the events.
The only remaining part is now to define the Type1, Type2, Type3, and Type4 events of the game G 1 , so that the above claims are true. This will finish the proof. For more details than provided in this sketch, we encourage the reader to read the full version of this paper. D • Type1-a event (Figure 7 (Type1-a)): This event occurs if y collides with the left-coordinate of a node already in T s .
• Type1-b event (Figure 7(Type1-b) ): This event occurs if y collides with the least-significant n bits of a query already in D s .
• Type1-c event (Figure 7(Type1-c) ): This event occurs if the least-significant n bits of output of a reverse s-query match with the left-coordinate of a node already in T s . Figure 5(b) ). All arrows are n bits. A red arrow denotes new n bits of output from the ideal permutation π/π −1 . The symbol "=" denotes n-bit equality.
Type2 Event
This event is mentioned in lines 100 and 102 of game G 1 . In order to define Type2 events, we need to classify all old query-response pairs to the oracles π/π −1 stored in D s , according to their known and unknown parts. The known part of a query-response pair is the part which is present in the view of the game G 1 , while the unknown part is not present. We note that there are seven types of such pairs. The first six types are generated due to the intermediate π calls made during l-queries. The type Q7 queries are the old s-queries. See Figure 8(a) . A Type2-a event occurs, if the output of a forward s-query is one of the types Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, and Q6, and the output can be distinguished from the uniform distribution. The Type2-b event occurs, if the output of a new forward s-query can be distinguished from the uniform distribution. (Figure 5(b) ). Green circles and green arrows denote n bits present in the view of the game. Red circles denote n bits not present in the view. A red arrow denotes new n bits of output from the ideal permutation π/π −1 . The symbols "=", and "==" denote n-bit and 2n-bit equality respectively.
Type3 Event
This event is mentioned in line 000 of game G 1 . A Type3 event occurs when an l-query M is submitted in the game G 1 , and JH π (M ) can be computed from the entries already stored in D s . We divide this case into three subcases, according to the final π-query. The first subase is when the final π-query is of type Q1, or Q2, or Q3. A simple observation shows that this case cannot happen, since this would imply a left-coordinate-collision in T s , forbidden by the occurrence of GOOD i . The second subcase is if the final π-query is of type Q4, or Q5, or Q6. The Type3 event occurs, if an adversary distinguishes the 2n bits of final output from the uniform distribution U[2 2n − 1]. Finally, the third subcase is when the final π-query is of type Q7. In this situation, the Type3 event occurs if JH π (M ) can be computed on an existing path of the graph T s , and if the path has an π-query/response whose type is one of Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5 and Q6. See Figure 8 (b) for a graphical description.
Type4 Event
The final event is mentioned in line 601 of game G 1 . A Type4 event occurs, if the input of a fresh reverse s-query matches with a query of type Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, or Q6. See Figure 8(c) .
We individually compute the probabilities of each of the events described in Section 4. We need the help of the following lemma to provide a rigorous analysis for the upper-bounds we compute in this section.
Lemma 5.1 (Correction Factor) If the advantage of an indifferentiable adversary A for the games G 1 and Game(RO, S, S −1 ), limited by σ queries, is bounded by ε, which is a negligible function in the security parameter n, then n 1 Pr GOOD i ≥ C for some constant C > 0, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ σ − 1, and for all n > 0. n Proof. Since ε < 1 for all n > 0, Pr A sets BAD in G 1 ≤ ε ≤ 1 − C 1 for some constant C > 0, and for all n n > 0. Also note that Pr GOOD i is a decreasing function in i. Hence the result. D
The Type1-a event guarantees that that if T s is GOOD i , then it has O(i) nodes, thus from Figure 7 , we obtain,
Using the definition of Type2 events in Section 4, and their representation in Figure 8(a) , it is easy to deduce:
Similarly, with the definition of Type3 events in Section 4, and Figure 8 (b), we find:
Finally, using the definition of Type4 events, it follows that:
We conclude with the following inequality which holds for 0 ≤ i ≤ σ − 1. By the upper-bounds computed above, we obtain
Therefore, by Lemma 4.1, for all A,
This last equation (4) yields the bound of n/2.
Experimental Results
We performed a series of experiments verifying our theoretical framework. Our simple C implementation of the game G 1 simulated the ideal permutation, π, with randomness supplied by rand(), by maintaining a database of input/output pairs, assuring that π is a permutation. The experiments were performed allowing varying proportions of reverse queries to determine the optimal adversarial strategy. n For each of these experiments, we collected data providing accurate estimates for the values Pr Type1 i+1 | GOOD i described in Section 4. Compiling these data we computed the relative percentage of Type1 events 1 3 when the proportion, R, of reverse queries were 0, Table 2 : The relative percentage of Type1 bad events for various values of n and R, the proportion of reverse queries allowed. Trivially, for R = 0, all bad events are Type1-a, and for r = 1, all bad events are Type1-c. The values were computed using 100000 simulations.
In addition to these event probabilities, we calculated security bounds for several values of n and R. The computation was achieved by randomly generating a large number of graphs T s , and determining the n number of queries, σ, required to cause σ−1 Pr Type1 i+1 | GOOD i ≥ 0.5.
i=0
We did not consider the Type2 and Type3 events, since, intuitively, their probabilities are dominated by those of the Type1 events, for any efficient adversary. However, a theoretical proof of the validity of this 7 assumption is still an open problem. We found that choosing the values at which to place the first query uniformly at random from among all possible maximal left-cosets was the most advantageous strategy for an adversary.
The results of the experiments following this method are summarized in Figure 9 . The data supports the theoretically obtained bound of σ = Ω(2 n/2 ) (see Equation 4 ). Some of the values in the graph are slightly lower than 1/2, due to the effect of constants. We expect the data to asymptotically approach 1/2. Figure 9 : Plot of experimental data of value of n versus the normalized logarithm of σ, log 2 (σ)/n, for the game G 1 with various values of r, the proportion of reverse queries allowed.
The data indicates that the optimal adversarial strategy for game G 1 is to disallow reverse queries. For each fixed R < 1, however, we observe that the data asymptotically approaches 1/2. Although it is the case that for R = 1, σ has an expected value of 2 n−1 , we conjecture that for any fixed value of R < 1, σ = Θ(2 n/2 ).
Conclusion
In this paper we improved the indifferentiability security bound of the JH hash mode of operation from n/3 bits to n/2 bits. We are currently experimenting to see if the bound could be further improved, by employing various techniques, including the allowance of n-bit collision a certain number of times or the utilization of higher phase rounds in which previous queries may allow T s to grow more rapidly. In addition, our very straight forward proof technique, which is strikingly different from most approaches in the literature, may be of independent interest.
